5 experience may be interpreted in racial or ethnic terms. 12 In terms of historical analysis, one risk is of a selective reading of the evidence and a neglect of the other categories that might also be relevant to understanding the character and identity of a group or of individuals. Let us immediately acknowledge that the deployment of (modern) categories is inevitable in historical work, as is the selection of relevant evidence, but this is precisely why ongoing critical scrutiny remains vital.
For example, Mason and Esler highlight the ways in which Clement of Alexandria presents 'a frontal attack on ethnos identity and loyalty… In the circle of Christ's truth, ethnos allegiance is dissolved'. 13 What this focus does not highlight, however, is the frequency with which Clement designates Christianity precisely as a new kind of 'people', distinguished from Jews and Greeks, using what Buell, following Jonathan Hall, calls an 'oppositional' kind of ethnic reasoning.
14 For example, Clement refers to 'three polities… that of the Jews… that of the Greeks… and that of the Christians' (τρεῖς πολιτείας... Ἰουδαίων... Ἑλλήνων... Χριστιανῶν, Strom. 5.14.98.4) 15 and he repeatedly affirms the declaration of 1 Pet 2.9-10, that Christians form 'the elect race… a holy nation, the people of God' (τὸ γένος τὸ ἐκλεκτόν... ἔθνος ἅγιον... λαὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, Prot. 4.59.3
[GCS]). 16 A particular way in which Clement challenges established 'ethnos identity', moreover, is through what Buell, again following Hall, calls an 'aggregative' or 'universalising' kind of ethnic reasoning to insist that all may potentially join this new 'people'. 17 As Buell puts it, Clement 'positions Christianity as an ethnos -but one that encompasses and erases all others, by referring to humans as one genos, unified by their common condition as created beings'. 18 For example, Clement announces how both open to various interpretations. 31 As Esler has noted elsewhere, commenting specifically on the reference to Atomos, 'dual or nested ethnicity' is not uncommon; this may be one way of accounting for those who apparently hold multiple ethnic identities. 32 revised depiction would, like earlier depictions, also be the product of both historical evidence and contemporary contexts -specifically our postmodern concern with the fluidity, complexity, and constructedness of identity -but that illustrates the point that historical scholarship is shaped by both ancient evidence and contemporary context, and that critical reflection should concern itself with both (a point to which I shall return).
Finally, a third kind of complexity arises from the evidence concerning changes in ethnicity, something that Mason and Esler seem to deny ('people do not come and go' from their ethnic identity). 39 Some scholars come to virtually the opposite conclusion. 40 Gideon Bohak, for example, suggests that the ancient world was one 'where the assimilation (or degeneration, depending on one's perspective) of immigrants into natives was virtually taken for granted'. 41 From this perspective, and noting the decline and then disappearance of the ethnic marker Ioudaios in Egyptian papyri between 330-30 BCE, Bohak questions the assumption of Jewish 'ethnic continuity' in Graeco-Roman Egypt, arguing that the descendants of Jewish migrants to Egypt during the Hasmonean period 'rarely were identified as "Jews" -either because they migrated back to Judea or because they assimilated into their surrounding environment'. 42 References to what are traditionally labelled as 'conversion' to or 'apostasy' from Judaism fit a similar picture:
while that terminology problematically implies an essentially 'religious' kind of boundary-crossing, the evidence nonetheless suggests that people could, and did, both join and leave the Jewish people, however much such moving might be subject to criticism. 43 In a wide-ranging survey of recent scholarship and primary evidence, have seen above, that ethnicity was not simply defined by 'blood' or birth. But the broader point stands. 57 As Esler puts it elsewhere, '"Religious" phenomena… certainly do occur [in the ancient world] but they are connected with, or rather embedded in, a wider identity that is best described as "ethnic" in character'. [78] [79] . 58 Esler, God's Court, 15 . 59 Esler, God's Court, 17. seed (Gal 3.29) cannot be so easily separated from other appeals to shared ancestry and kinship. As with the appeals for converts to leave one (ancestral) way of life and begin another, so too in the realm of ancestry and kinship, it is hard neatly to separate early Christian discourse from the wider realm of ethnic discourse among Jews and other people-groups.
On Critical Reflection
The preceding sections offer some reasons why I continue to find a clear categorical contrast between Jewish ethnicity and 'superordinate', 'trans-ethnic' Christian identity at best partially cogent, 65 and needing significant nuance and diversification. It 
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Mason and Esler's objections are several: that the distinction they draw is a purely historical one, based on the evidence of the sources; that in any case it was a difference 'not in the Christians' favour'; 67 that they explicitly disavow any connection between this historical perspective and Western Christian triumphalism or supercessionism; and that my suggestions are made without evidence.
In making a response to such points, two initial observations seem pertinent, both of which I will build on further below. The first is that I deliberately offered these (tentative) concluding remarks in a general way, relating them to the tendencies and location of the discipline rather than to particular individuals' work, becausenotwithstanding the question of whether the suggestions are found plausible -I do not think it is helpful to personalise the issues. It is also important to note that I did not 65 claim that proponents of the categorical distinction between Jewish/Judaean ethnicity and Christian trans-ethnic openness were themselves promoting or supporting such contemporary socio-political or religious ideologies -indeed quite the opposite is likely the case; rather, that the persistence of various forms of this dichotomy may both reflect and legitimate the particular contemporary contexts of that historical work. The second observation, closely related to the first, is that attempts to probe the ways in which our discipline's concepts, categories, historical analyses and reconstructions may be shaped by their location in contemporary socio-political, geographical, religious and ethno-racial contexts will inevitably and necessarily entail considering something other than the explicit intentions and arguments any of us presents. For that reason, indeed, we cannot convincingly dismiss such critical probing simply by asserting that we explicitly reject the ideological or political tendencies in which our work may be implicated, whether this is supercessionism or some other regrettable 'ism'. 68 As Arnal comments in relation to the ways in which constructions of the historical Jesus reflect contemporary identity issues, 'the question of personal agenda is irrelevant'; it is the 'correspondence' between certain historical constructions and contemporary perspectives that is pertinent. 86 But nonetheless it is the Pauline moral vision that stands at the centre of reflection on contemporary social challenges. It is a work, then, which displays the marks of its production in a specific historical, religious, and geo-political context.
Such critical analysis does not mean that I regard either my own earlier work or that of Esler -from which I have learnt so much -as lacking in substantial historical, exegetical, or ethical insight. Nor does it mean that I reject the relevance and importance of reflection on the contemporary issues that clearly lie as motivations behind both our studies. But it does mean that such work can and should be subjected to a critical scrutiny that seeks, in part, to assess not only the historical and exegetical claims, but also the ways in which the knowledge generated is a product of a particular time and place. In Walter Mignolo's words, 'the knower is always implicated, geo-and bodypolitically, in the known'; and what is known is always known by 'a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space'. 87 This kind of particularising of our own work, acknowledging the partiality and specificity of our insight, I have argued elsewhere, following in the footsteps of others, 88 is crucial both to recognising our need for the insights of other differently embodied interpreters and also to giving equal value to a wide variety of perspectives in biblical studies rather than assigning some a marginal status around an unlabelled but dominant core. 89 Indeed, to end on what I hope is both an irenic and a challenging point, I am quite prepared to admit that I may be wrong in my particular suggestions concerning the ways in which the scholarly dichotomy between Jewish ethnicity and trans-ethnic Christianity may, in part, reflect its contexts of production. But I would reiterate the challenge to probe critically the ways in which our historical categories and analyses are, unavoidably, in some ways shaped by their contexts of production, and that those contexts have geopolitical, ethno-racial, and religious dimensions. This kind of metacritical analysis is by no means uniquely required of New Testament or early Jewish studies -and it has sometimes concerned the basic configuration and orientation of whole disciplines. 90 It is, as I have remarked elsewhere, 'easier to see how the scholarship of the past was enmeshed in the racial and religious ideologies of its time than it is to appreciate how far our own present work continues to be shaped by such ideologies'. 91 Difficult as it may be, part of our critical self-analysis as scholars should be to try to reflect on the ways in which our particular location shapes our work. Our concepts and categories both arise from and take effect within particular contemporary contexts.
Probing our biases must therefore go deeper than aligning ourselves with either a 'humanistic' or a 'social-scientific' approach, and responsible history must do more than proclaim the desire to 'understand the past as it was'. 92 
